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In this paper we use data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine 
differences in retirement behavior, wealth, Social Security and pension benefits by race 
and gender.  The differences observed among groups are sometimes substantial.  We then 
estimate models jointly explaining retirement and wealth by race and gender.  We 
decompose differences in outcomes into those due to differences in parameters of the 
preference function for leisure and goods, time preference rates, and those due to 
differences in the circumstances of the members of each group.  By circumstances we 
mean both the opportunity set, and factors that determine the disutility of continued work, 
such as health status.  We find that differences in outcomes among white, black and 
Hispanic males are not due to differences in preferences for leisure and goods 
consumption, but are due both to differences in time preference and to differences in 
circumstances.  Differences in outcomes between men and women are primarily due to 








This paper was supported by a grant from the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) 
to the Michigan Retirement Research Center, UM 03-13.  The opinions and conclusions 
are solely those of the authors and should not be construed as representing the opinions or 
policy of SSA, the Michigan Retirement Research Center, or the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Alan L. Gustman is Loren Berry Professor of Economics at 
Dartmouth College, Department of Economics, Hanover, N.H. 03755 
(alan.l.gustman@dartmouth.edu).  Thomas L. Steinmeier is Professor of Economics, 
Texas Tech University, Department of Economics, Lubbock, Texas 79409 
(Thomas.Steinmeier@TTU.edu).  I. Introduction. 
In this paper we use data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine differences in 
retirement behavior, wealth, Social Security and pension benefits by race and gender.  The 
differences observed among groups are sometimes substantial.  We then estimate models jointly 
explaining retirement and wealth by race and gender.  We decompose differences in outcomes 
into those due to differences in parameters of the preference function and those due to 
differences in the circumstances of the members of each group.  By circumstances we mean both 
the opportunity set, and factors that determine the disutility of continued work, such as health 
status.   
The paper begins with a descriptive analysis.  It examines retirement outcomes, Social 
Security incomes, pensions and other wealth.  Social Security is further decomposed into AIME 
and PIA.  Distributions are generated for demographic groups delineated by race, ethnicity, 
gender and marital status.   
After examining the differences among groups in these variables, we fit structural 
retirement models to data for each group and consider the causes of retirement behavior within 
each group.  The approach involves fitting a joint structural model of retirement and wealth for 
each group individually, and examining the reasons for differences in outcomes.  The elements 
of the budget constraint, Social Security, pensions and wage offers for full and part time work, as 
well as health status, age and year of birth, are allowed to differ among the groups.  They exert 
separate influences on retirement from those of preferences of those who fall within each group. 
A decomposition analysis allows us to determine the reasons for differences in outcomes, 
and to determine the likely effects of aggregating across categories on the reliability of the 
estimates obtained with models of retirement.     
   1We find that differences in circumstances promote later retirement by black and Hispanic 
men relative to whites, while differences in time preferences have the opposite effect.  Higher 
time preference means that actuarial adjustments for postponing benefit receipt is not as 
attractive for minorities.  Differences in outcomes between men and women are primarily due to 
differences in preferences, which lead to earlier retirements for women.   
Section II examines the descriptive data.  The retirement model to be estimated is 
presented in Section III.  Section IV presents the basic estimates of the parameters of the 
structural model.  Section V examines the separate influences of the preference functions and 
circumstances, due to opportunity sets, health status and age.  Section VI concludes. 
II. Descriptive Analysis 
  This study uses data from the first six waves of The Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
a longitudinal survey designed to allow explicit measurement of these different constraints.
 1  
The survey is taken every two years, so the data cover the period 1992 through 2002.  These data 
cover 12,652 persons from households with a respondent who was 51 to 61 years old in 1992.  
The study also uses restricted, linked employer provided pension plan descriptions and Social 
Security earnings records matched with respondents in 1992.   
The dependent retirement variable is based on hours of work.
2  The percentages retired 
from full-time work and completely retired are calculated as percentages among those 
respondents who had retirement status observations at each particular age.
3   
                                                           
1 The Health and Retirement Study is supported principally by a grant from the National Institute 
on Aging to the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.  Additional support 
is provided by the Social Security Administration and other federal agencies. 
2 Individuals working over 30 hours per week and more than 1560 hours per year are counted as 
full-time.  Individuals working more than 100 hours per year but less than 25 hours per week or 
1250 hours per year are counted as part time, and individuals not doing any work are counted as 
fully retired.  Individuals who fall between full time and part time or between part time and 
retired are classified on the basis of self reports. 
   2A. Retirement Statistics   
Throughout this paper we are going to report results for career workers.  To be classified 
as a career worker, between age 40 and the last year of full time work, a person must have 
worked full time in at least half the years.  In addition, one must be observed to have worked full 
time in some year at or after turning age 50.  The baseline data for all career workers in the HRS 
is presented in Table 1.  The first column of numbers reports retirements from full time work.  
The second column reports the flow into full retirement.  Thus the first column also includes 
those who leave full time work for partial retirement and directly into full retirement, while the 
last column includes the flows from full time work directly into full retirement, as well as the 
flow from partial retirement into full retirement.  From columns 1 and 2 we see the familiar sharp 
spike in retirements at age 62, fourteen percent of career workers leaving full retirement and 
twelve and a half percent entering full retirement.  The smaller spikes in retirements at age 65 are 
also readily apparent.  These numbers, which are really pseudo retirement rates, are calculated as 
the difference in succeeding ages in the overall level of retirements, as reported in Columns 3 
and 4.  The difference between columns 3 and 4 is the fraction who are in partial retirement.  As 
can be seen from Table 1, the fraction partially retired is about nine percent at age 60, fourteen 
percent at age 65, and somewhat smaller thereafter.   
To provide some perspective on the effect of using career workers as the basis for the 
retirement measures employed throughout the rest of this study, we also have calculated 
retirement outcomes for all persons in the HRS, whatever their work history.  These data are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 A person who is on disability insurance is considered to be out of the retirement calculation.  
Such a person is not included in either the numerator or the denominator of the retirement 
measure.  For example, if a person worked during the first two surveys, and then entered DI on 
the third survey, this person is in the calculation in the first two surveys, but is out of the 
numerator and denominator once having joined DI. 
 
   3presented in Appendix Table 1.  The fraction retired is much higher when the full population is 
used instead of the career workers, especially at younger ages when an hours based definition of 
retirement implies that those with little early commitment to the labor force are nevertheless 
properly categorized as retired.  Table 2 calculates the differences in the share of the relevant 
population retired when the sample is confined to career workers vs. all persons.  At age 50, the 
fraction retired from full time work for career plus noncareer workers exceeds the fraction retired 
from full time work for career workers by almost 25 percentage points.  The difference in the 
fraction completely retired is about 17 percentage points between estimates based on the two 
different population bases. 
From this point on we report disaggregated results.  All disaggregated retirement rates 
pertain to Career workers.  Tables 3 and 4 report the baseline retirement results from Table 1 
separately for men and women.  Once again, the sharp spikes at ages 62 and 65 are readily 
apparent.  The differences in levels of retirement between men and women are reported in Table 
5.  From column 1 we see that women are 5.7 percentage points more likely to be retired from 
full time work than men at age 50; 9.4 percentage points more likely to be retired than men at 
age 60; 8.5 percent more likely at age 62; and 6.7 percent more likely at age 65.   The differences 
in complete retirement are slightly smaller than for retirement from full time work, except at age 
65. 
Tables 6, 7 and 8 disaggregate retirement rates for white, black and Hispanic males 
respectively.  Once again each data set shows a sharp spike in retirements at age 62, 14.9 
percentage points for white males, 15.8 percentage points for black males, and 12.7 percentage 
points for Hispanic males.  However, the retirement spike is much smaller for white males at age 
65 than it is for black and Hispanic males.  For whites the age 65 spike in retirements from full 
   4time work is 8.4 percentage points, while for black and Hispanic males it is 15.2 and 12 
percentage points, about the same size spike at 65 as at 62. 
Differences in the percentages retired from full time work, and the percentages retired 
completely for males, by race, are reported in Table 9.  With exceptions at a couple of ages, 
blacks are more likely to be retired than whites.  The largest difference is 8 percentage points at 
age 62 in the percent completely retired.  Differences between Hispanic and white men are are 
reported in the last two columns of Table 9.  After age 60, Hispanic men are less likely to be 
retired than are white men.  The differences rise to over 11 percentage points for 63 and 64 year 
old men. 
Comparable baseline statistics are reported by race for women in Tables 10 through 12, 
with differences in retirement levels reported in Table 13 between black and white women, and 
Hispanic and white women.  For all three groups, there is a sharp spike in retirements at age 62.  
The sharpest spike seen for any group at 62 is that for Hispanic women, with 20.6 percent 
retiring exactly at age 62, compared to 13.2 percent and 14.3 percent of black and white women 
at age 62.  The spike in retirements from full time work at age 65 is very small for white women 
at just under 8 percentage points.  For black women the spike is 7.3 percentage points.  But for 
Hispanic women, the spike is 14.5 percentage points.  Although there is strong evidence of 
retirement at the early and normal entitlement ages of Social Security for all groups, the strongest 
relation among all groups is found for Hispanic women. 
In Table 13 we see only small differences in retirement levels between black and white 
women.  The differences also bounce a lot between white and Hispanic women.  Hispanic 
women are slightly less likely to be retired from full time work than white women through age 
55.  Then for most of the years through age 63, they are more likely to be retired than white 
   5women, sometimes substantially so.  At older ages, the cells get thinner, making the story less 
clear. 
Appendix Tables 2 through 5 present the basic indicators of retirement levels and 
retirement flows for married and single males, and for married and single females respectively.  
Table 14 reports the differences in retirement levels between married and singles, for men and 
women respectively.  Married men are much less likely to be retired than single men, while 
married women are much more likely to be retired than single women.  When we focus on the 
differences in the percent retired from full time work, for those between the ages of 58 and 62, 
these differences reach double digit levels.  They are larger in absolute terms for women than 
men, but substantial for each.  
B. Wealth, Social Security Benefits and Pensions 
Table 15 provides descriptive statistics on wealth, Social Security benefits, pension 
coverage and pension wealth by gender, race and marital status.  In the model we will estimate 
below, wealth is not a determinant of retirement, but is jointly determined with retirement.  
Social Security benefits and pension benefits actually received depend on work and retirement 
choices, but are framed by the rules governing Social Security and pensions.   
Line 1 of Table 15 reports average values for all career workers in the sample.  As of the 
initial wave of the Health and Retirement Survey, 1992, mean wealth is $200,000 for the sample, 
outside of pensions and Social Security.  Median wealth is $98,000.  The annualized value of 
AIME at age 62 averages $20,500 and the annualized value of the PIA averages $8,900.  Over 70 
percent have a pension.  Of those with positive benefits from DB plans, the annual DB benefit 
averages $12,000, while for those with a DC account, the value at retirement is $94,000.  We do 
not discuss the distributions of Social Security benefits or wealth here, or the adequacy of 
   6replacement rates in retirement.  In earlier work we found that for about three quarters of the 
HRS population, replacement rates appeared to be adequate, and that Social Security was not as 
redistributive among families as the PIA formula would suggest.  For a discussion of these 
issues, see Gustman and Steinmeier (1999 and 2001). 
Turn now to compare the results for career workers who are men vs. women.  
Remembering that wealth is a household concept, wealth held by women is 80 percent of the 
wealth held by men.  AIME for women is less than two thirds the AIME for men among those 
who fit our definition of career workers.  PIA for women is about three quarters of the PIA of 
men, which means that few of these women will be collecting spouse benefits.  Five percent 
fewer women are covered by a pension than men.  DB pension benefits at retirement received by 
women are 60 percent of the value of DB pension benefits received by men, while their DC 
pension balances are worth 43 percent of the balances for men.  Thus the differences in DB 
pension values are in line with earnings differences while the difference in DC values is wider 
than the difference in earnings. 
Next compare the results for black and Hispanic men to the results for white men.  
Overall, the differences in nonpension, nonSocial Security wealth holdings between Black and 
Hispanic men on the one hand, and white men on the other, and in the values of DC accounts, are 
wider than the difference in covered earnings over their lifetimes.  In contrast, the differences in 
Social Security benefits, pension coverage, and the values of payments under DB plans for those 
receiving positive payments are narrower than the differences in earnings.  To be more specific, 
wealth held by black and Hispanic men amounts to about a third of the wealth held by white 
men.  Black men earned about three quarters of the level earned by white men, while Hispanic 
men earned about 70 percent of the level earned by white men.  Blacks and Hispanics will enjoy 
   7about four fifths of the PIA received by white men.  The difference in pension coverage between 
black and white men is about 5 percentage points, but it is 25 percentage points between 
Hispanic and white men.  Defined benefit pensions held by black men will pay just over 80 
percent of the pensions received by white men, while the pensions held by Hispanic men will 
pay just under two thirds the benefits received by white men.  DC accounts held by black men 
are worth about 58 percent of the value of the accounts held by whites, while the comparable 
figure for Hispanic men is 50 of the value of DC plans held by white men.   
Differences in wealth levels and DC balances are wider than differences in earnings 
between black and white women, while differences in Social Security AIME, pension coverage 
and DB pension values are narrower than differences in earnings – indeed, DB pension values 
are higher for black women receiving benefits than they are for white women.  Differences in 
wealth levels, pension coverage, and DB pension values are wider than differences in earnings 
between Hispanic and white women.  Specifically, black women have about 40 percent of the 
wealth of white women, while Hispanic women average about 56 percent of the wealth of white 
women, with a smaller value when median wealth is compared.  Black women earned about 94 
percent of the earnings of white women, with Hispanic women earning about 86 percent of the 
earnings of white women.  Black women’s AIME is about 96 percent of the value for white 
women, while the ration of Hispanic women is 86 percent.  There is only a one percentage point 
difference in pension coverage between white and black women, while the difference is 20 
percentage points between Hispanic and white women.  Pensions are six percent higher for black 
women with DB benefits than for white women, while Hispanic women have DB pensions worth 
about three quarters of the value of DB pensions for white women.  Black women have three 
   8fourths the DC balances of white women, while Hispanic women have over 85 percent of the DC 
balances of white women.  
Although single men have 11 percent lower earnings (as measured by AIME) than 
married men, and single women have seven percent lower earnings (AIME) than married 
women, the differences in wealth holdings are much greater between married and singles.  
Singles actually have higher DC balances than married.  Remembering that the wealth figures 
are not prorated in married households, in the case of males, the differences in wealth holdings 
are almost two to one, while for women they are bigger than two to one, so if taken on a per 
capita basis, wealth levels held by married and singles are not so greatly out of line with 
differences in earnings.  Indeed, given the predominance of two earner households, wealth levels 
may be disproportionately lower in two earner households in comparison to earnings.  
Otherwise, except for a ten percentage point difference in pension coverage, other differences 
between married and singles are not substantial. 
III. The Basic Retirement Model 
  The basic model is a structural, dynamic model of retirement and saving that we have 
developed in previous work.
4  This model specifies a lifetime expected utility function with the 
time path of consumption and leisure as arguments.  The constraints include an asset 
accumulation equation and an uncertain lifetime.  Workers are allowed to partially retire, usually 
in different jobs from those held in prime working age.  As a result, work when partially retired 
typically pays a lower wage rate.  Social Security enters as income in the asset accumulation 
equation in the years that benefits are received.  The current utility value of the future benefits is, 
                                                           
4 We have used the model for policy analysis, in one case simulating the effects of raising the 
Social Security early entitlement age (Gustman and Steinmeier, forthcoming) and in another, 
simulating certain proposals made by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2002).  A full description of the methodology in estimating the model 
and using it to simulate policy is found in our earlier work. 
   9of course, heavily dependent on the worker’s time preference rate.  Retirement preferences and 
time preferences are both allowed to be heterogeneous among workers.   
The utility function is given by 
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In this equation,  T  is the maximum lifespan and  m  refers to the family structure at time  t  
(both spouses alive, only the husband alive, or only the wife alive).  sm t  is the probability of 
family structure  m  at time  t,   C  is consumption,  and  L  is the leisure, which takes on a value 
of 0 for full-time work, 1 for full retirement, and  2
1  for partial retirement.
5    X includes a 
constant, age, health status, and vintage.  The age variable and worsening health cause leisure to 
become gradually more attractive as the individual ages.  The time preference term ρ is a fixed 
effect, and the leisure preference term  ε  is a random effect drawn from a normal distribution.  
γ  is also random effect, taken so that the term     comes from the exponential distribution  
 defined over the range 
γ L
γ δ γ =
L ke ) L ( f 2
1  to 1, which is the theoretically acceptable range for  L .   
k is the constant necessary for the density function to integrate to unity, as it must.  Since partial 
retirement seems to become relatively more attractive as the individuals age, we specify 
γ
δ  to be 
increasing in age:   .  Estimation is based on the general method of simulated 
moments.  The simulated moments come from the average moments of solving the model for 
10,000 draws of the random effects. 
) Age ( a 0 δ + δ = δ
                                                           
5 In recognition that consumption is more valuable while both spouses are alive, the consumption 
function is adjusted so that the marginal utility for a surviving spouse is approximately equal to 
that for a couple consuming 40% more.  
 
   10  The model is estimated for each specified demographic group from the Health and 
Retirement Study using observations for the first six waves of the survey, every other year from 
1992 through 2002.  Earnings profiles are taken from Social Security records or, if these are not 
available, from the retrospective information in the respondent surveys.  Actual earnings from 
1992 through 2002 are taken from the respondent survey.  Future potential earnings are projected 
on the basis of tenure and experience coefficients of earnings regressions.  Pension benefits, 
conditional on tenure in the job providing the pension, are based on information in the summary 
pension descriptions, provided by the employers.  Social Security benefits are based on the 
earnings histories and figured according to the Social Security rules.  
  The model has 8 parameters to be estimated.  These include the consumption parameter  
α,  four elements of  β  including the constant and coefficients for age, poor health, and birth 
year, two elements of  δ  including a constant and a coefficient of age, and the standard deviation 
of retirement preferences given by  σε.  The model is estimated using the generalized method of 
simulated moments.
6  This method essentially chooses the parameters so as to minimize the 
differences between a set of observed statistics (moments) in the sample and the values of those 
statistics that would be implied by the model.  In the minimization, the moments are weighted so 
as to provide the most precise estimates possible with the data. 
  The estimation uses 46 moments, including the fraction of the sample working full time 
and the fraction fully retired at various ages.  Additional moments are calculated at various ages 
for specific groups in the sample, including early and late birth cohorts, high and low lifetime 
earners, and those with poor health.  If the model is correct, the q-statistic comes from a  χ
2  
distribution with the degrees of freedom given by the number of moments minus the number of 
parameters.  In the present model, this translates into a  χ
2  distribution with 38 degrees of 
                                                           
6 For a description, see Greene (2000). 
   11freedom (46 moments less 8 parameters), which has a 95% confidence bound of approximately 
53.4.   
The estimation also calculates a value of  ρi,  the time preference rate, for each individual 
in the sample.  The values of  ρi  are calculated so that for the parameter values, the assets that 
are calculated from the model for each individual are equal to the assets (including financial, real 
estate, and business assets) actually observed in 1992.  The resulting distributions of  ρ  implies a 
wide variation in the rates of time preference for different individuals.   
As in our recent work, the model is capable of simulating most of the spike in retirements 
at age 62, despite the fact that there are no age dummy variables included in the model, and that 
the Social Security benefit formula is actuarially fair around age 62.   
IV. Estimates of the Structural Models 
Estimates of the parameters of the structural models for men and women are presented in 
Tables 16 and 17.   These tables are for married men and married women who have bee married 
for the long term, where long term marriage is defined as not having a prior marriage after the 
age of 35.  All of the key parameters are significant.   
There are considerable differences in the preference parameters between men and 
women.  Most notable are the differences in the coefficients on the age variables for β, 
suggesting women will be less sensitive to incentives from Social Security and other rewards 
than men.  There also are differences in the parameters associated with health status, with 
women less sensitive to poor health than men.  To judge the effects of these parameter 
differences on retirements, in the next section we will conduct a number of simulations. 
We also tried to estimate the differences in retirement preferences by race for men.  We 
began by estimating the model for white males in long term marriages.  Parameters are close in 
   12value to those presented in Table 16, which provided a hint of the results to come.  We then 
attempted to estimate the retirement model for married black males.  There were too few 
observations to allow convergence.  The same was true for runs for Hispanic males.  
Accordingly, we pooled the data for married males of all races, and added four variables to the 
preference function for minority status.  Two dummy variables indicated the person was black or 
Hispanic, and two variables reflecting an interaction between minority status and age.  As seen in 
Table 18, the coefficients on these dummy variables are not close to significant at conventional 
levels.   
We should note that although we use the same utility function parameters for different 
ethnic groups due to the failure find that the dummy variables for black and Hispanic males were 
significant, there are clear differences among these three groups in time preferences.  Using the 
combined parameters, 57.6% of whites have time preferences of below 10%, plus or minus 
2.8%, blacks have 34.6% below 10%, plus or minus 5.4%, and Hispanics have 25.8% below 
10%, plus or minus 6.2%.  The numbers are little affected if we use the model with specific 
parameters for each group.  These results undoubtedly arise from the fact that whites are more 
likely to have financial wealth.   
As a result, when analyzing differences by race and ethnicity for men, we will be 
focusing on results analyzing the effects of differences in what we can call circumstances, which 
include both differences in the values for the variables in the utility function and the budget line, 
and differences in time preference rates. Here we use the same parameters in the utility function 
for white males, black males and Hispanic males, allowing the time preference rates and budget 
lines to differ. 
   13V. Simulations to Separate the Retirement Effects of Preference Parameters from 
Those of Individual Circumstances. 
In this section we separate the effects on retirements due to variation of individual 
circumstances by gender, race and ethnicity from those of the parameters of the utility function.  
Here we define individual circumstances as health, age, vintage and elements of the budget set. 
Tables 19 presents the results of simulations of the effects on both retirement outcomes – 
retirement from full time work and full retirement -- of the different utility function parameters 
estimated separately for men and women, as well as the effects of the different circumstances 
unique to men and women.  Thus these retirement outcomes are generated with the utility 
function parameters for men and the circumstances for men and then women, and then the utility 
function parameters for women, and the circumstances for men and then women.   
Tables 20 and 21 present the differences in retirement outcomes from changing the utility 
function and keeping the circumstances constant, and changing the circumstances, but keeping 
the utility function constant.  Table 20 pertains to retirements from full time work, while Table 
21 pertains to complete retirements.  Column 1 in each table presents the actual differences in 
retirement outcomes between women and men, showing the considerable tendency for women to 
retire earlier than men.  The differences in column 2 compare outcomes using the utility function 
and circumstances for women minus the utility function and circumstances for men.  This fully 
simulates the sources of differences in retirement tendencies between women and men.  The 
model overstates the difference in retirements for women from age 56 to 62, turning a twelve to 
sixteen percentage point differential into an 18 to 22 percent differential.  Otherwise, it does a 
good job of simulating the reasons for differences in retirement rates between women and men. 
   14We present basic Oaxaca decompositions.  Columns 3 and 6 are one decomposition and 
columns 4 and 5 are the other.  The 4,5 decomposition says that the utility function explains 
practically the entire difference, with the budget sets playing only a small role.  The 3,6 
decomposition says that the utility function parameters overexplain the difference, with the 
budget sets actually working in the reverse direction.  It is entirely possible for the two ways to 
do an Oaxaca decomposition to give different results, so this is not necessarily a failure of 
method.  The general message is that the utility function parameters are much more important 
relative to circumstances in explaining the differences between the retirements of men vs. 
women. 
Since the parameters of the utility functions are statistically indistinguishable among 
white, black and Hispanic men, but time preference rates are not, Table 22 reports the joint 
effects of differences in time preferences and circumstances.  This calculation uses a utility 
function in which there are no dummy variables for race or ethnicity, and no interactions of race 
and ethnicity with age.
7  The outcome reported is the probability of complete retirement.  Tables 
23 and 24 decompose the total effects into those due to differences in circumstances (Table 23) 
and to differences in time preference (Table 24).  These findings indicate that differences in 
circumstances promote later retirement by black and Hispanic men relative to whites, while 
differences in time preferences have the opposite effect.  Because the effects of differences in 
time preference may be substantial, it will be important for studies of retirement among men to 
standardize for the effects of differences in time preference among men from different racial and 
ethnic backgrounds.  This finding is in contrast to the findings with regard to preferences for 
consumption goods vs. leisure, which do not seem to differ among groups. 
                                                           
7 Appendix Table 6 reports results using the utility function estimates which include the (insignificant) coefficients 
on measures of the impact of race and ethnicity.  Outcome levels are reported by race and ethnicity for both 
retirement from full time work and full retirement.   
   15VI. Conclusion 
This paper has used data from the Health and Retirement Study to examine differences in 
retirement behavior, wealth, Social Security and pension benefits by race and gender.  The 
differences observed among groups are sometimes substantial.  We estimated models jointly 
explaining retirement and wealth by race and gender.  We decomposed differences in outcomes 
into those due to differences in parameters of the preference function and those due to 
differences in the circumstances of the members of each group.  Circumstances include both the 
opportunity set, and factors that determine the disutility of continued work, such as health status.   
Because of limited numbers of black and Hispanic married males, we pooled the data for 
married males of all races, and added four variables for minority status to the preference function 
for leisure. Two dummy variables indicated the person was black or Hispanic, and two variables 
reflected an interaction between minority status and age.  Jointly, these four variables are 
statistically not significant.  However, the distribution of time preferences is statistically different 
among the groups, so we report the effects of differences in circumstances vs. differences in time 
preferences.  Differences in circumstances promote earlier retirement by black and Hispanic men 
relative to whites, while differences in time preferences have the opposite effect.   
Next we consider the results of simulations of the effects on retirement outcomes of the 
different preference function parameters estimated separately for men and women, as well as the 
effects of the different circumstances unique to men and women.  Thus these retirement 
outcomes are generated with the preference function parameters for men and the circumstances 
for men and then women, and then the preference function parameters for women, and the 
circumstances for men and then women.  Differences in preferences provide the major 
explanation for the earlier retirement of women.  That is, women retire earlier than men due not 
   16to differences in health or the budget set, but primarily due to differences in preferences for 
market work. 
In addition to providing an in depth analysis of differences in wealth, Social Security and 
pensions by gender and race, these findings also lead to a recommendation on methodology.  In 
conducting studies of retirement and saving, researchers need not allow for differences in 
parameters by race and ethnicity reflecting preferences for leisure and consumption; but time 
preference rates do differ by race and ethnicity and should be incorporated in any analysis of 
retirement.  Researchers should also allow for differences in preference function parameters 
between men and women. 
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   18Table 1: Retirements for Career Workers, Both Genders, All Races, All Marital Status Groups 
 
















Age    
50 7.4  5.6 7.4 5.6 1344 
51 1.3  0.6 8.7 6.2 1835 
52 1.4  0.6 10.1 6.8 2351 
53 2.4  2.4 12.5 9.1 2714 
54 2.6  1.8 15.1 10.9 3044 
55 4.0  3.1 19.1 14.0 3342 
56 2.1  1.6 21.2 15.6 3696 
57 2.2  1.6 23.4 17.2 3866 
58 3.1  2.2 26.5 19.4 4031 
59 3.8  2.9 30.3 22.3 4166 
60 6.0  4.9 36.3 27.2 4112 
61 7.1  5.9 43.5 33.1 3666 
62 14.3  12.6 57.7 45.8 3298 
63 6.4  4.5 64.1 50.3 2970 
64 5.0  5.7 69.2 56.0 2626 
65 8.8  7.2 77.9 63.2 2241 
66 3.7  2.9 81.6 66.1 1884 
67 2.6  3.3 84.2 69.4 1568 
68 2.5  1.9 86.6 71.3 1265 
69 1.7  3.1 88.4 74.4 945 
 
Observations: 8768 
   19Table 2: Difference in Retirement Rates by Career Status:  
Rates for Career Plus Noncareer Workers Minus Rates for Career Workers 








50 24.6  16.7
51 23.2  15.4
52 20.6  14.1
53 19.5  13.5
54 18.3  12.7
55 16.5  11.4
56 15.8  11.5
57 15.6  11.2
58 14.9  11.0
59 14.0  10.5
60 12.9  10.1
61 11.1  8.6
62 7.9  6.2
63 6.5  5.9
64 5.7  5.3
65 3.9  4.2
66 3.0  3.7
67 2.5  2.9
68 2.1  2.7
69 1.6  2.1
 
   20Table 3: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, All Races, All Marital Status Groups 
















Age    
50 3.9  3.1 3.9 3.1 514 
51 1.8  1.2 5.7 4.3 810 
52 1.5  0.9 7.2 5.3 1141 
53 2.1  1.5 9.2 6.8 1373 
54 2.5  1.7 11.8 8.5 1577 
55 3.6  2.7 15.4 11.2 1776 
56 2.3  1.7 17.7 12.9 2032 
57 1.9  1.6 19.5 14.5 2154 
58 3.4  2.7 23 17.2 2254 
59 3.2  1.9 26.2 19.2 2391 
60 6.2  5.1 32.4 24.2 2386 
61 7.1  6.0 39.5 30.2 2157 
62 14.9  12.8 54.4 42.9 2003 
63 6.2  4.1 60.5 47.0 1845 
64 5.8  5.9 66.3 52.9 1682 
65 9.3  7.4 75.6 60.2 1474 
66 3.9  3.4 79.6 63.6 1278 
67 3.0  3.6 82.6 67.2 1079 
68 2.7  1.8 85.3 69.0 912 
69 2.6  4.5 87.9 73.4 730 
 
Observations: 5059
   21Table 4: Retirements for Career Workers, Females, All Races, All Marital Status Groups 
 
















Age   Age  
50 9.6  7.1 9.6 7.1 830 
51 1.5  0.5 11.1 7.6 1025 
52 1.7  0.6 12.8 8.2 1210 
53 3.1  3.4 15.9 11.6 1341 
54 2.7  2.0 18.6 13.6 1467 
55 4.8  3.6 23.4 17.2 1566 
56 2.1  1.7 25.5 18.9 1664 
57 2.7  1.7 28.2 20.6 1712 
58 2.7  1.7 31.0 22.3 1777 
59 4.8  4.4 35.8 26.6 1775 
60 6.0  4.7 41.8 31.3 1726 
61 7.3  6.0 49.1 37.4 1509 
62 13.8  12.7 62.9 50.1 1295 
63 7.0  5.5 70.0 55.6 1125 
64 4.2  6.0 74.2 61.7 944 
65 8.1  7.2 82.3 68.8 767 
66 3.5  2.4 85.8 71.3 606 
67 1.9  2.9 87.7 74.2 489 
68 2.4  3.1 90.1 77.3 353 
69 -0.3  0.3 89.8 77.7 215 
 
Observations: 3709
   22Table 5: Difference in Retirement Rates by Gender:  
Rates for Females Minus Rates for Males 
 








Age    
50 5.7  4.0 
51 5.4  3.3 
52 5.6  2.9 
53 6.7  4.8 
54 6.8  5.1 
55 8.0  6.0 
56 7.8  6.0 
57 8.7  6.1 
58 8.0  5.1 
59 9.6  7.4 
60 9.4  7.1 
61 9.6  7.2 
62 8.5  7.2 
63 9.5  8.6 
64 7.9  8.8 
65 6.7  8.6 
66 6.2  7.7 
67 5.1  7.0 
68 4.8  8.3 
69 1.9  4.3 
 
   23Table 6: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, Whites, All Marital Status Groups 
 
















Age    
50 3.4  2.7 3.4 2.7 414 
51 1.6  1.1 4.9 3.7 647 
52 1.3  0.9 6.2 4.6 898 
53 2.0  1.3 8.2 5.9 1099 
54 2.5  1.4 10.7 7.3 1280 
55 4.1  3.4 14.8 10.7 1454 
56 1.7  1.4 16.5 12.0 1654 
57 1.7  1.6 18.2 13.6 1754 
58 4.2  3.2 22.4 16.8 1847 
59 3.2  1.7 25.6 18.5 1955 
60 6.8  5.5 32.4 24.0 1959 
61 7.2  6.0 39.6 30.1 1777 
62 14.9  12.1 54.5 42.2 1669 
63 6.5  4.3 61.1 46.5 1554 
64 6.3  6.4 67.3 52.9 1420 
65 8.4  6.8 75.7 59.7 1242 
66 3.9  3.7 79.6 63.3 1069 
67 3.0  3.5 82.6 66.9 902 
68 2.6  1.6 85.2 68.5 765 
69 2.8  4.4 88.1 72.9 612 
 
Observations: 3987
   24Table 7: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, Blacks, All Marital Status Groups 
















Age    
50 7.4  5.6 7.4 5.6 54 
51 3.5  4.2 10.9 9.8 92 
52 1.9  -0.6 12.8 9.2 141 
53 2.0  1.7 14.7 10.9 156 
54 1.5  1.9 16.3 12.8 172 
55 2.0  -0.2 18.3 12.6 191 
56 5.3  4.2 23.6 16.7 233 
57 2.2  1.6 25.8 18.4 256 
58 0.7  0.7 26.5 19.1 257 
59 3.5  3.7 30.0 22.7 277 
60 4.1  4.2 34.1 27.0 267 
61 7.7  5.7 41.7 32.6 242 
62 15.8  17.8 57.5 50.5 212 
63 4.6  1.6 62.1 52.1 190 
64 1.6  1.7 63.7 53.8 171 
65 15.2  9.9 79.0 63.7 157 
66 3.4  3.2 82.4 66.9 136 
67 1.6  2.0 84.0 68.9 106 
68 1.4  1.9 85.4 70.8 89 
69 -0.5  5.9 84.9 76.7 73 
 
Observations: 667
   25Table 8: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, Hispanics, All Marital Status Groups 
















Age          
50 4.3  4.3 4.3 4.3 46 
51 1.3  -1.5 5.6 2.8 71 
52 2.2  3.1 7.8 5.9 102 
53 4.0  3.4 11.9 9.3 118 
54 4.9  5.9 16.8 15.2 125 
55 0.8  0.1 17.6 15.3 131 
56 3.8  2.0 21.4 17.2 145 
57 3.6  1.5 25.0 18.8 144 
58 -0.3  0.6 24.7 19.3 150 
59 2.4  1.4 27.0 20.8 159 
60 1.7  1.1 28.8 21.9 160 
61 5.3  5.7 34.1 27.5 138 
62 12.7  12.6 46.7 40.2 122 
63 2.8  5.4 49.5 45.5 101 
64 6.5  5.0 56.0 50.5 91 
65 12.0  12.1 68.0 62.7 75 
66 6.0  -1.0 74.0 61.6 73 
67 6.3  7.4 80.3 69.0 71 
68 5.9  3.4 86.2 72.4 58 
69 4.9  3.1 91.1 75.6 45 
 
Observations: 405
   26Table 9: Differences in Retirement Rates By Race and Ethnicity 
for Males: Rates for Blacks and Hispanics Minus Rates for Whites. 
 Black  Minus  White 
Hispanic Minus 
White 














50 4.0  2.9  0.9 1.6
51 6.0  6.1  0.7 -0.9
52 6.6  4.6  1.6 1.3
53 6.5  5.0  3.7 3.4
54 5.6  5.5  6.1 7.9
55 3.5  1.9  2.8 4.6
56 7.1  4.7  4.9 5.2
57 7.6  4.8  6.8 5.2
58 4.1  2.3  2.3 2.5
59 4.4  4.2  1.4 2.3
60 1.7  3.0  -3.6 -2.1
61 2.1  2.5  -5.5 -2.6
62 3.0  8.3  -7.8 -2.0
63 1.0  5.6 -11.6 -1.0
64 -3.6  0.9  -11.3 -2.4
65 3.3  4.0  -7.7 3.0
66 2.8  3.6  -5.6 -1.7
67 1.4  2.0  -2.3 2.1
68 0.2  2.3  1.0 3.9
69 -3.2  3.8  3.0 2.7
 
   27Table 10 Retirements for Career Workers, Females, Whites, All Marital Status Groups 
















Age    
50 9.9  7.1 9.9 7.1 646 
51 1.3  0.3 11.2 7.4 784 
52 1.5  0.8 12.7 8.2 912 
53 3.0  3.3 15.7 11.5 1011 
54 2.4  2.2 18.2 13.7 1096 
55 5.3  3.9 23.4 17.6 1174 
56 1.8  1.4 25.2 19.0 1243 
57 2.8  1.6 27.9 20.6 1278 
58 2.5  1.6 30.5 22.1 1333 
59 5.1  4.5 35.6 26.7 1324 
60 5.9  4.5 41.4 31.2 1303 
61 7.6  6.4 49.0 37.6 1145 
62 13.2  12.5 62.2 50.1 990 
63 6.9  5.2 69.2 55.3 856 
64 5.5  6.7 74.7 61.9 730 
65 7.9  6.6 82.5 68.6 601 
66 2.7  1.1 85.2 69.6 474 
67 2.3  3.1 87.5 72.7 377 
68 2.6  3.9 90.1 76.6 273 
69 -1.4  -0.8 88.8 75.7 169 
 
Observations: 2720
   28Table 11 Retirements for Career Workers, Females, Blacks, All Marital Status Groups 
















Age          
50 9.0  7.6 9.0 7.6 145 
51 2.5  1.2 11.5 8.7 183 
52 2.0  0.2 13.5 9.0 223 
53 4.6  4.8 18.0 13.7 255 
54 2.2  0.6 20.3 14.3 286 
55 3.2  1.8 23.5 16.1 298 
56 2.1  2.0 25.6 18.1 320 
57 1.4  1.1 27.0 19.2 333 
58 4.2  2.6 31.2 21.9 343 
59 4.9  4.2 36.1 26.1 341 
60 8.1  6.5 44.2 32.6 319 
61 6.3  3.8 50.5 36.4 275 
62 14.3  12.1 64.8 48.5 233 
63 7.0  6.8 71.8 55.3 206 
64 0.7  5.0 72.6 60.4 164 
65 7.3  6.3 79.8 66.7 129 
66 7.8  8.6 87.6 75.2 105 
67 -1.3  0.9 86.4 76.1 88 
68 2.0  -1.1 88.3 75.0 60 
69 2.8  4.4 91.2 79.4 34 
 
Observations: 740
   29Table 12 Retirements for Career Workers, Females, Hispanics, All Marital Status Groups 
 
















Age    
50 7.7  5.1 7.7 5.1 39 
51 0.9  1.8 8.6 6.9 58 
52 3.4  -1.6 12.0 5.3 75 
53 -1.3  0.0 10.7 5.3 75 
54 8.2  4.1 18.8 9.4 85 
55 3.5  5.5 22.3 14.9 94 
56 6.4  4.9 28.7 19.8 101 
57 6.9  5.9 35.6 25.7 101 
58 1.0  0.0 36.6 25.7 101 
59 0.6  2.4 37.3 28.2 110 
60 1.2  1.6 38.5 29.8 104 
61 7.6  8.4 46.1 38.2 89 
62 20.6  17.4 66.7 55.6 72 
63 7.9  6.3 74.6 61.9 63 
64 -2.6  0.1 72.0 62.0 50 
65 14.5  19.1 86.5 81.1 37 
66 2.4  4.1 88.9 85.2 27 
67 6.9  6.5 95.8 91.7 24 
68 -0.8  3.3 95.0 95.0 20 
69 5.0  5.0 100.0 100.0 12 
 
Observations: 249
   30  
Table 13: Differences in Retirement Rates By Race and Ethnicity 
for Females: Rates for Blacks and Hispanics Minus Rates for Whites. 
 
 Black  Minus  White 
Hispanic Minus 
White 














50 -0.9  0.5  -2.2 -2.0
51 0.3  1.3  -2.6 -0.5
52 0.8  0.8  -0.7 -2.9
53 2.3  2.2  -5.0 -6.2
54 2.1  0.6  0.6 -4.3
55 0.1  -1.5  -1.1 -2.7
56 0.4  -0.9  3.5 0.8
57 -0.9  -1.4  7.7 5.1
58 0.7  -0.2  6.1 3.6
59 0.5  -0.6  1.7 1.5
60 2.8  1.4  -2.9 -1.4
61 1.5  -1.2  -2.9 0.6
62 2.6  -1.6  4.5 5.5
63 2.6  0.0  5.4 6.6
64 -2.1  -1.5  -2.7 0.1
65 -2.7  -1.9  4.0 12.5
66 2.4  5.6  3.7 15.6
67 -1.1  3.4  8.3 19.0
68 -1.8  -1.6  4.9 18.4
69 2.4  3.7  11.2 24.3
 
   31Table 14: Differences in Retirement Rates By Marital Status 
for Males and Females: Rates for Married Minus Rates for Singles. 
 
 Males    Females 














50 -1.7  -1.0  1.9 -0.4
51 -1.0  -1.6  3.9 1.6
52 -4.4  -3.2  7.1 4.3
53 -10.0  -7.8  7.8 5.3
54 -7.9  -6.7  6.2 6.4
55 -8.6  -6.8  9.0 9.1
56 -8.9  -8.3  9.4 8.3
57 -6.7  -5.6 12.1 8.1
58 -10.6  -9.6  15.1 11.1
59 -10.6  -9.6  13.2 10.0
60 -10.2  -10.0  12.9 9.2
61 -11.6  -9.8  13.4 11.7
62 -11.5  -9.0  16.8 17.3
63 -6.1  -4.5 16.3 15.4
64 -0.6  -5.1 15.0 13.1
65 -0.1  -8.2 11.1 12.5
66 2.2  -6.8 8.7 9.3
67 0.0  -9.1 9.8 8.1
68 -1.4  -6.1  8.9 8.5
69 0.8  -6.4 6.6 4.1
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AIME at age 
62 (mean)

























201 98 20497 8886  71.44 12094 94
Male 220 107 23985 9918  73.65 14398 122
Female 175 88 15279 7344  68.43 8668 53
White Male  257 132 25423 10356  76.45 15078 131
Black Male  86 45 19104 8446  71.06 12051 76
Hispanic Male  86 46 17869 8029  50.37 9795 66
White Female  205 111 15596 7449  70.04 8674 56
Black Female  87 42 14668 7143  68.65 9186 42
Hispanic Female  115 40 13373 6698  50.20 6334 48
Married Male  234 120 24364 10029  75.00 14604 120
Single Male  133 36 21653 9231  65.40 13008 137
Married Female  218 117 15592 7445  69.76 8601 28
Single Female  87 31 14568 7115  65.52 8830 50
1. Excludes those with substantial business wealth. 
2. At actual or projected retirement age.
   33Table 16: Estimation of Parameters of the Utility Function For Long Term Married Males, All 
Races 
 
Symbol Description  Coefficient 
Value 
t-statistic 
σε  Std. Dev. Of Epsilon  4.88 9.2437 
δ0  Constant  -3.05 -5.6029 
δ1  Age  0.68 3.3981 
β0  Constant  -10.346 -158.037 
β1  Age  0.113 4.7524 
β2  Health  3.65 4.9774 
β3  Vintage  0.03 0.3507 
α  Consumption   -0.42 -5.0027 
    
  Number  obs.  2231 
  q:  69.584 
 
   34Table 17: Estimation of Parameters of the Utility Function For Long Term Married Females, All 
Races 
 
Symbol Description  Coefficient 
Value 
t-statistic 
σε  Std. Dev. Of Epsilon  5.52 9.4347 
δ0  Constant  -2.10 -2.0368 
δ1  Age  0.16 2.0827 
β0  Constant  -9.605 -86.4343 
β1  Age  0.174 2.8885 
β2  Health  2.04 2.5493 
β3  Vintage  0.10 1.1121 
α  Consumption   0.21 1.9360 
    
  Number  obs.  1417 
  q:  81.89 
 
   35Table 18: Estimation of Parameters of the Utility Function For Long Term Married Males, 
Including Variables Reflecting Ethnicity and Race 
 
Symbol Description  Coefficient 
Value 
t-statistic 
σε  Std. Dev. Of Epsilon  4.80 9.5168 
δ0  Constant  -2.99 -5.3178 
δ1  Age  0.64 3.3888 
β0  Constant  -10.366 -160.012 
 Black  -0.046 -0.2926 
 Hispanic  -0.245 -0.6028 
β1  Age  0.138 4.2226 
 Age*Black  0.105 0.5409 
 Age*Hispanic  0.148 0.6536 
β2  Health  3.28 4.6993 
β3  Vintage  0.06 0.7576 
α  Consumption   -0.42 -5.2671 
    
  Number  obs.  2231 
  q:  75.682 
 
 
   36Table 19: Simulated Effects for Men and Women of Different Utility Function Parameters and Different Circumstances on Retirement 
from Full Time Work  
 
  Retired from Full Time Work  Fully Retired 
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2.6 1.6 5.5 7.5 1.6 1.2 3.5 4.9
51 3.8 2.4 7.8 10.2 2.3 1.7 5.0 6.8
52 5.2 3.3 10.4 13.4 3.2 2.2 6.9 8.9
53 6.7 4.7 13.4 17.2 4.3 3.2 9.2 11.7
54 8.6 6.1 17.1 21.0 5.8 4.0 12.0 14.5
55 11.9 8.3 22.6 26.4 8.2 5.6 16.3 18.6
56 15.0 10.4 27.9 31.6 10.6 7.1 20.5 22.6
57 18.8 12.8 33.7 37.3 13.5 8.7 25.3 27.1
58 23.2 15.6 40.0 43.5 17.1 10.6 30.8 32.1
59 28.0 19.1 46.3 49.6 20.9 12.9 36.3 37.1
60 35.1 24.2 54.2 56.9 26.5 16.3 43.3 43.3
61 41.0 28.9 60.7 63.1 31.3 19.3 49.4 48.8
62 53.1 40.1 69.9 71.4 39.5 24.0 58.0 55.5
63 58.0 44.5 74.2 75.4 43.2 26.3 62.5 59.5
64 63.2 50.1 78.6 79.9 47.4 29.5 67.4 64.1
65 71.2 57.8 84.1 84.8 54.3 34.9 73.2 69.8
66 77.0 65.2 87.9 88.7 59.4 41.8 77.6 75.6
67 81.8 71.3 91.0 91.6 63.7 46.3 81.7 79.6
68 86.2 77.9 93.7 94.2 68.1 51.9 85.7 83.9
69 90.3 83.2 95.6 96.0 74.3 60.3 89.0 87.8
 
   37Table 20: Differences in Simulated Retirements from Full Time Work for Men and Women Using Different Utility Function 
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8.1 4.9 -1.0 2.0 2.9 5.9
51 9.0 6.4 -1.4 2.4 4.0 7.8
52 8.7 8.2 -1.9 3.0 5.2 10.1
53 10.3 10.5 -2.0 3.8 6.7 12.5
54 11.3 12.4 -2.5 3.9 8.5 14.9
55 13.0 14.5 -3.6 3.8 10.7 18.1
56 12.2 16.6 -4.6 3.7 12.9 21.2
57 13.6 18.5 -6.0 3.6 14.9 24.5
58 15.1 20.3 -7.6 3.5 16.8 27.9
59 14.6 21.6 -8.9 3.3 18.3 30.5
60 14.8 21.8 -10.9 2.7 19.1 32.7
61 16.5 22.1 -12.1 2.4 19.7 34.2
62 15.7 18.3 -13.0 1.5 16.8 31.3
63 17.2 17.4 -13.5 1.2 16.2 30.9
64 16.0 16.7 -13.1 1.3 15.4 29.8
65 12.5 13.6 -13.4 0.7 12.9 27.0
66 9.8 11.7 -11.8 0.8 10.9 23.5
67 9.4 9.8 -10.5 0.6 9.2 20.3
68 7.5 8.0 -8.3 0.5 7.5 16.3
69 6.1 5.7 -7.1 0.4 5.3 12.8
  
   38Table 21: Differences in Simulated Complete Retirements for Men and Women Using Different Utility Function Parameters and 
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5.3 3.3 -0.4 1.4 1.9 3.7
51 6.3 4.5 -0.6 1.8 2.7 5.1
52 5.1 5.7 -1.0 2.0 3.7 6.7
53 8.2 7.4 -1.1 2.5 4.9 8.5
54 10.2 8.7 -1.8 2.5 6.2 10.5
55 10.8 10.4 -2.6 2.3 8.1 13.0
56 10.1 12.0 -3.5 2.1 9.9 15.5
57 9.6 13.6 -4.8 1.8 11.8 18.4
58 10.8 15.0 -6.5 1.3 13.7 21.5
59 11.6 16.2 -8.0 0.8 15.4 24.2
60 10.6 16.8 -10.2 0.0 16.8 27.0
61 12.4 17.5 -12.0 -0.6 18.1 29.5
62 13.7 16.0 -15.5 -2.5 18.5 31.5
63 15.4 16.3 -16.9 -3 19.3 33.2
64 14.3 16.7 -17.9 -3.3 20 34.6
65 13.4 15.5 -19.4 -3.4 18.9 34.9
66 11.6 16.2 -17.6 -2.0 18.2 33.8
67 9.9 15.9 -17.4 -2.1 18.0 33.3
68 10.4 15.8 -16.2 -1.8 17.6 32.0
69 6.4 13.5 -14.0 -1.2 14.7 27.5
  
   39 Table 22: Simulated Effects of Differences in Time Preference and Different Circumstances by Race and Ethnicity on Complete 
Retirement  




White  Black 
 
Hispanic 
         
               
       
             
             
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
               
Circumstances
 
White Black Hispanic White Black White Hispanic
Age
50 2.7 3.6 2.4 9.8 2.6 10.6  2.0
51 3.9 4.3 2.8 11.8 3.8 13.0 2.8
52 5.3 5.5 3.8 14.1 5.4 15.4 3.9
53 6.8 7.3 4.7 16.5 6.8 18.4 4.6
54 8.9 9.2 5.8 19.3 8.4 21.5 5.8
55 12.4 11.3 7.7 24.1 11.3 25.9 7.6
56 15.7 14.1 9.7 28.0 14.1 29.8 9.7
57 19.6 17.0 12.3 32.2 17.9 34.0 12.2
58 24.1 20.3 15.2 36.7 21.8 38.5 15.8
59 29.0 24.6 18.0 41.4 27.2 43.1 19.6
60 36.2 33.0 23.0 47.5 34.9 49.2 24.1
61 42.2 38.6 28.4 52.6 41.0 54.5 30.0
62 53.0 48.9 38.7 64.3 58.0 66.7 47.4
63 57.7 53.2 43.2 68.7 63.3 71.0 52.5
64 63.0 58.9 48.5 73.0 68.2 75.1 57.6
65 71.6 67.6 56.2 78.8 74.1 80.7 62.9
66 77.5 74.3 62.2 83.0 79.0 84.5 69.0
67 82.3 79.3 68.1 86.6 83.1 87.8 74.5
68 86.6 83.9 74.4 89.9 87.4 90.8 80.8
69 90.3 87.9 79.9 92.9 91.5 93.6 87.7
 
   40Table 23: Simulated Effects of Differences in Circumstances by Race and Ethnicity on Complete Retirement  
(Using Utility function parameters for Married Males from Equation with No Racial Binaries in Beta Vector) 
 
Time Preference  White White Black Hispanic
 
Circumstances 





















Black  minus  White
 
Hispanic Minus 





50 0.9 -0.3 -7.2 -8.6
51 0.4 -1.1 -8 -10.2
52 0.2 -1.5 -8.7 -11.5
53 0.5 -2.1 -9.7 -13.8
54 0.3 -3.1 -10.9 -15.7
55 -1.1 -4.7 -12.8 -18.3
56 -1.6 -6 -13.9 -20.1
57 -2.6 -7.3 -14.3 -21.8
58 -3.8 -8.9 -14.9 -22.7
59 -4.4 -11 -14.2 -23.5
60 -3.2 -13.2 -12.6 -25.1
61 -3.6 -13.8 -11.6 -24.5
62 -4.1 -14.3 -6.3 -19.3
63 -4.5 -14.5 -5.4 -18.5
64 -4.1 -14.5 -4.8 -17.5
65 -4 -15.4 -4.7 -17.8
66 -3.2 -15.3 -4 -15.5
67 -3 -14.2 -3.5 -13.3
68 -2.7 -12.2 -2.5 -10
69 -2.4 -10.4 -1.4 -5.9
   41Table 24: Simulated Effects of Differences in Time Preference by Race and Ethnicity on Complete Retirement  












   
     
       
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Circumstances White White Black Hispanic
Age
50 7.1 7.9 -1 -0.4
51 7.9 9.1 -0.5 0
52 8.8 10.1 -0.1 0.1
53 9.7 11.6 -0.5 -0.1
54 10.4 12.6 -0.8 0
55 11.7 13.5 0 -0.1
56 12.3 14.1 0 0
57 12.6 14.4 0.9 -0.1
58 12.6 14.4 1.5 0.6
59 12.4 14.1 2.6 1.6
60 11.3 13 1.9 1.1
61 10.4 12.3 2.4 1.6
62 11.3 13.7 9.1 8.7
63 11 13.3 10.1 9.3
64 10 12.1 9.3 9.1
65 7.2 9.1 6.5 6.7
66 5.5 7 4.7 6.8
67 4.3 5.5 3.8 6.4
68 3.3 4.2 3.5 6.4
69 2.6 3.3 3.6 7.8
 
   42Appendix Table 1: Retirements for Career and Non-Career Workers Combined, 
Both Genders, All Races, All Marital Status Groups 


















50 32.0  22.3 32.0 22.3 2021
51 -0.1  -0.6  31.9 21.6 2692
52 -1.2  -0.7  30.7 20.9 3325
53 1.3  1.7  32.0 22.6 3842
54 1.4  1.0  33.4 23.6 4292
55 2.1  1.8  35.6 25.4 4666
56 1.4  1.7  37.0 27.1 5087
57 2.0  1.3  39.0 28.4 5334
58 2.4  2.0  41.4 30.4 5568
59 2.9  2.4  44.3 32.8 5739
60 4.9  4.4  49.2 37.3 5637
61 5.4  4.5  54.6 41.7 4996
62 11.0  10.3 65.6 52.0 4468
63 5.0  4.1  70.6 56.2 4010
64 4.2  5.1  74.9 61.3 3517
65 6.9  6.1  81.8 67.4 2978
66 2.8  2.4  84.6 69.8 2475
67 2.1  2.4  86.7 72.3 2030
68 2.0  1.7  88.7 74.0 1604
69 1.3  2.5  90.0 76.5 1176
 
Observations: 12,652 
   43Appendix Table 2: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, All Races, Married 
















Age    
50 3.6 3.0 3.6 3.0 439 
51 1.9 1.1 5.5 4.1 687 
52 1.0 0.7 6.5 4.8 967 
53 1.2 0.8 7.7 5.6 1164 
54 2.9 1.9 10.6 7.5 1345 
55 3.5 2.7 14.1 10.2 1512 
56 2.3 1.6 16.4 11.8 1744 
57 2.3 2.0 18.7 13.8 1871 
58 3.0 2.2 21.6 16.0 1965 
59 3.1 1.9 24.8 17.9 2075 
60 6.2 5.0 31.0 22.9 2073 
61 7.0 6.0 38.0 28.9 1883 
62 15  12.9 53.0 41.9 1769 
63 6.8 4.6 59.9 46.5 1639 
64 6.4 5.9 66.3 52.3 1513 
65 9.3 7.1 75.6 59.4 1326 
66 4.1 3.6 79.8 63.0 1162 
67 2.8 3.5 82.6 66.5 993 
68 2.6 2.1 85.2 68.5 845 
69 2.8 4.6 88.0 73.1 691 
 
Observations: 4348 
   44Appendix Table 3: Retirements for Career Workers, Males, All Races, Single 
















Age    
50 5.3 4.0 5.3 4.0 75 
51 1.2 1.7 6.5 5.7 123 
52 4.4 2.4 10.9 8.0 174 
53 6.8 5.4 17.7 13.4 209 
54 0.8 0.8 18.5 14.2 232 
55 4.2 2.8 22.7 17.0 264 
56 2.6 3.1 25.3 20.1 288 
57 0.1  -0.7 25.4 19.4 283 
58 6.7 6.2 32.2 25.6 289 
59 3.3 1.9 35.4 27.5 316 
60 5.8 5.4 41.2 32.9 313 
61 8.4 5.8 49.6 38.7 274 
62 14.9 12.2 64.5 50.9 234 
63 1.5 0.1 66.0 51.0 206 
64 0.8 6.4 66.9 57.4 169 
65 8.8  10.2 75.7 67.6 148 
66 1.9 2.3 77.6 69.8 116 
67 5.0 5.8 82.6 75.6 86 
68 4.0  -1.0 86.6 74.6 67 
69 0.6 4.9 87.2 79.5 39 
 
Observations: 711
   45Appendix Table 4: Retirements for Career Workers, Females, All Races, Married 
 
















Age    
50 10.0  7.0 10.0 7.0 681 
51 2.0 0.9 12.0 8.0 791 
52 2.7 1.3 14.7 9.3 893 
53 3.3 3.7 18.0 13.0 979 
54 2.4 2.5 20.4 15.4 1043 
55 5.6 4.4 26.0 19.9 1102 
56 2.4 1.6 28.5 21.5 1134 
57 3.7 1.8 32.2 23.3 1145 
58 4.1 2.9 36.3 26.2 1149 
59 4.3 4.1 40.6 30.3 1129 
60 5.9 4.4 46.5 34.7 1095 
61 7.6 7.0 54.1 41.7 949 
62 14.9 14.6 69.0 56.3 831 
63 6.9 4.9 75.9 61.2 717 
64 3.9 5.3 79.8 66.6 589 
65 6.7 7.1 86.5 73.6 474 
66 2.8 1.4 89.3 75.0 364 
67 2.3 2.4 91.6 77.4 297 
68 2.0 3.2 93.5 80.6 217 
69 -1.5 -1.5 92.1 79.1 139 
 
Observations: 2543
   46Appendix Table 5: Retirements for Career Workers, Females, All Races, Single 
















Age          
50 8.1 7.4 8.1 7.4 149 
51 0.1  -1.0 8.1 6.4 234 
52 -0.5 -1.4 7.6 5.0 317 
53 2.7 2.7 10.2 7.7 362 
54 3.9 1.2 14.2 9.0 424 
55 2.9 1.8 17.0 10.8 464 
56 2.0 2.4 19.1 13.2 530 
57 1.0 2.0 20.1 15.2 567 
58 1.1 0.0 21.2 15.1 628 
59 6.2 5.2 27.4 20.3 646 
60 6.2 5.2 33.6 25.5 631 
61 7.1 4.5 40.7 30.0 560 
62 11.4  9.0 52.2 39.0 464 
63 7.4 6.8 59.6 45.8 408 
64 5.2 7.7 64.8 53.5 355 
65 10.6  7.6 75.4 61.1 293 
66 5.2 4.6 80.6 65.7 242 
67 1.2 3.6 81.8 69.3 192 
68 2.8 2.8 84.6 72.1 136 
69 1.0 2.9 85.5 75.0 76 
 
Observations: 1166 
   47Appendix Table 6: Retirement, Long Term Married Men: Utility Function Includes Indicators of Race and Ethnicity and Interactions with Age 
 
  From Full Time Work 
 
Completely Retired 
       
                 
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
Observed Predicted Observed Predicted
Age  White   Black  Hispanic 
 
White  Black  Hispanic 
 
White   Black  Hispanic 
 
White  Black  Hispanic 
  50 3.4 11.8 4.5 2.8 1.5 0.5 2.5 11.8 4.5 1.8 0.5 0.4
51 4.5 6.1 8.3 4.0 2.2 0.9 2.7 6.1 5.6 2.5 0.8 0.7
52 6.7 8.3 13.8 5.4 3.4 1.4 4.5 8.3 10.3 3.5 1.2 1.1
53 8.9 13.0 13.1 6.9 4.5 2.0 5.9 11.1 8.2 4.6 1.9 1.5
54 11.0 18.3 12.9 9.1 6.4 2.9 6.9 15.0 9.7 6.2 3.0 2.3
55 15.2 14.9 10.3 12.6 9.3 4.3 10.7 10.4 10.3 8.8 4.8 3.4
56 16.5 20.9 14.1 15.8 12.5 6.5 12.4 17.6 9.4 11.4 7.0 5.0
57 19.9 26.6 22.2 19.7 16.5 9.4 15.3 19.3 16.7 14.5 9.9 7.2
58 23.4 29.1 20.8 24.2 21.0 13.0 17.9 19.1 16.9 18.2 13.5 10.1
59 27.1 31.9 24.1 29.1 26.7 17.7 19.7 22.7 20.3 22.1 17.8 13.5
60 33.3 35.4 30.8 36.2 34.9 23.3 26.2 29.2 24.4 28.0 24.4 17.7
61 39.9 41.9 34.7 42.1 42.2 30.3 32.0 33.3 29.3 32.7 30.6 23.1
62 55.2 58.7 43.1 53.0 58.5 46.2 44.0 53.3 36.9 40.4 42.9 34.0
63 61.3 60.9 44.7 57.7 65.1 53.4 47.5 54.3 40.4 44.1 48.4 39.5
64 68.3 63.4 54.5 62.9 71.1 60.7 54.8 56.1 47.7 48.3 54.5 45.6
65 76.1 81.1 68.6 71.6 76.9 66.9 60.6 66.2 62.9 55.5 61.5 52.7
66 80.5 86.4 73.5 77.4 82.2 74.0 64.7 69.7 64.7 60.5 67.7 60.0
67 83.6 87.0 78.1 82.3 86.7 80.5 67.8 69.6 71.9 64.7 72.4 66.7
68 86.8 88.4 82.1 86.5 90.8 86.3 71.3 69.8 75.0 68.7 77.4 72.9
69 88.5 89.2 84.2 90.2 94.2 92.0 75.5 81.1 73.7 73.9 84.0 81.9
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